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16. 3. 2009 15:01

"10 Years After NATO Expansion: Successes, Challenges, Expectations" Conference

This year we celebrate important anniversaries. Not only 10 years since the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO. But also 60 years since the Alliance was founded and 20 years since the fall of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, these numbers symbolise how the world is spinning faster. How quickly our successes become a thing of the past. How quickly new challenges pop up. How quickly we must again and again reevaluate our expectations. From the standpoint of the global security balance, more happened in the 10 years after the fall of the Evil Empire, than happened in the last half century. And in the decade after our joining, this development has continued to speed up.

I have no ambition to appear before you here with an expert lecture. Other security experts are only now creating, or must create, NATO's new strategy. The words successes, challenges and expectations appear in the the theme of this conference. I think one word joins all three of these terms. Liberty. The main success of the Alliance is the defence of liberty. The challenges of the future lie in the defence of liberty. And without a successful defence of liberty, NATO has no prospects for the future.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is without a doubt the most successful defence grouping in history. NATO has succeeded in its main mission, the one it was founded for. It won the Cold War, which was caused by the launching of iron curtains across the European continent. The result and confirmation of this success is precisely the membership of former communist countries in the Alliance.

NATO's success in the Cold War was so clear-cut that some called for its cancellation, because it had fulfilled its purpose. But in the defence of liberty, the Alliance is not and cannot be a tool for one use. There was no end of history, either, and it is not ending, liberal democracy is not a definitive victor in history, and the world is no safer than at the time of the two rival blocs. Maybe it's on the contrary. In some ways, NATO today is back at the beginning. Its basic mission – the defence of liberty – remains. Liberty is the alpha and omega of NATO's existence, the reason for its birth and its guarantee of survival. But tools and methods leading to this goal are far less certain than they were 60 years ago.

The free world proved to be more powerful economically than the communist evil empire. And of course, more politically-consolidated and stable as well. The latter must not be forgotten. Even if NATO is above all a defence alliance, one whose military strength depends directly on economic potential, it has really always achieved its goals due to the right political decisions. To its citizens, the free world was worth defending, and what's more, it also attracted inhabitants from the enemy's countries. In reality, no direct military confrontation of both blocs took place during the Cold War. Conflicts took place in marginal areas, and despite all the arms races, it was above all a political rivalry.

Policy is important today as well, when we no longer have one main clearly-defined military threat, behind which is a unifying ideology with a predictable and, in its way, conservative behaviour. A simple implication is also no longer valid: The free world equals economic superiority equals military advantage. We can also not rely on the idea that it's enough to remove the tyrants and people living in a country which threatened the world will welcome us as liberators and take care of the rest themselves, as was the case with citizens of the Warsaw Pact states.

These factors will definitely not weaken the importance of the defence of liberty. Of course, it makes the mission more demanding, more subtle and more multidimensional. The Alliance cannot change by giving up its founding ideals. It is still true that NATO's military strength depends on economic potential, and that on the amount of liberty in the Euro-Atlantic grouping. It is also still holds true that without political stability, without a permanent strong will for the defence of liberty, as united the Alliance at the time of the Cold War, its military units are only an empty shell, a paper tiger.

The Alliance therefore must not change internally. I am convinced of that. But it must adapt its presence to a changed global environment. And it is already doing so, even if it is somewhat ad hoc. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, NATO reached beyond its borders as never before in history. In a situation where de facto only one combat-ready worldwide military force remained, the standard arguments were heard about why not to take a stand in defence of liberty. Just as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968. After the Cold War, one couldn't say "We won't help you, because we cannot irritate the Soviet Union." And when someone is the only one who can do something, then they simply must do it. As Thomas Jefferson said: All tyranny needs to get a foothold is for people of good conscience to remain silent.

The Alliance has suddenly found itself before a number of conflicts which previously were resolved on the basis of efforts to maintain the status quo. Today, nothing of the sort exists, and the global balance and order can be fatally disrupted either by regional powers such as Iran, or by relatively small and weak, but sufficiently determined entities, such as those of a sub-state character. I am convinced that from a purely military standpoint, NATO has passed muster in these conflicts and missions. Even if it has shown that the structure of the Alliance must adapt to the new character of the threats. And I must thank the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, for starting these reforms of NATO for the 21st century. And at the next anniversary summit, under his leadership, he will tell us more.

In any case, NATO has carried out a mission that corresponds to the definition of a just war. It has always been about fighting in defence of liberty, winnable in a reasonable amount of time, and carried out in such a way as to cause less suffering than the suffering it sought to prevent. What is far more consequential is that the Alliance was not adequately politically prepared for the new types of conflicts after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Which is not even its fault, as a result of the unpreparedness of the entire Free World.

The new enemies of liberty cannot simply be scared off by nuclear arsenals, and it is not even enough to defeat them militarily. The Soviet empire collapsed as a result of an inability to sustain the arms race. As a result, democratic institutions, which had traditions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were renewed. Iraq and Afghanistan represent societies of a different type. After a military victory, after "hard power, what follows is a need for "soft power" - a far longer and very difficult stage of building civil institutions.

Yes, it is still about the same goal as 60 years ago: The defence of liberty. But not only about defending our liberty from an external enemy, but about the positive effort to build a free society in an area where it has never functioned. This is now not just a military problem. It is not even only a political problem, but literally philosophical. I am not one of those who argues that liberty and human rights are a Western invention, one which can easily be forced upon the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, every human being desires liberty from the time of their birth. But it simply isn't possible to implement civic law and the structures of civil society within a couple of years somewhere else, when ours has been formed over centuries and especially not by force.

Solutions to this problem exceed the possibilities of NATO's military structure. Here is where a wide field opens up for cooperation with the EU, which represents precisely this "soft" civilian power. It has been confirmed that both Euro-Atlantic institutions are in no way competing, but are on the contrary complementary – the EU represents economic and NATO security cooperation. The EU does not have the resources to achieve a victory for liberty and the Alliance does not have the resources to maintain it. It makes no sense to have one without the other, and the future of the Euro-Atlantic space as a zone of liberty, security and prosperity, as well as peace and stability in the world, depends on both.

The topic of Afghanistan will be one of the main points of the NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl at the beginning of April. It is key that we succeed in this complicated mission. A civilian loss in Afghanistan would turn the entire military victory into dust. On the other hand, the country's reconstruction must be secured by an adequate number of soldiers. I welcome the new American administration's decision to strengthen the contingent in Afghanistan, and will do everything I can so that the Czech Republic does its part.

The need for cooperation between NATO and the EU does not just relate to foreign missions, but to our own civilisation space as well. The new character of threats places us not only before the need to plan complex military-civilian actions abroad, but also before the need to prevent mass and ruthless attacks on defenceless and unsuspecting citizens. If at the introduction I said that NATO's basic mission remains the defence of liberty, but under new terms the fulfilment of this task is a more subtle concern, then it is precisely here where the most sensitive point lies. The question is: How much may we ourselves preventively limit citizens' liberty in order to prevent them from a treacherous attack? It is hard for us to find the answers, but we must not lack good will in this.

In its essence, it is far easier to make a decision on building an anti-missile shield which will protect our civilians from the threat of attack, but as opposed to air traffic control or an anti-terror legislation, it in no way limits our liberty. On this issue, NATO has decisively shown its will toward common defence, a will to not allow the part of the Alliance that is overseas to enjoy a higher level of security than in Europe. For this reason, in the future I do not expect a more emphatic discussion on the issue of the radar, and I consider the current one to be a tempest in a teacup. We must constantly and deeply discuss the battle between civil rights and security, as this topic deserves.

While it is immensely complicated to find military answers to new threats lurking both tens of thousands of kilometers away and right on our streets, despite this I consider the issue of terrorism to be a problem primarily on the political level. We must be cohesive. We must know the meaning of both liberty and security. Our democracies must show the will to defend ourselves and each other. Our political system is and may be exposed to difficult tests of stability. Our enemies know that they cannot defeat us militarily, but fear is their ally. Fear that leads to the denial of liberty, and with it, the hollowing out of democracy. On Wednesday we commemorated the sorrowful anniversary of five years since the bloody attacks in Madrid, whose goal was nothing less than to influence free elections.

For this reason it is supremely important that the entire political scene be unified. As it was after September 11, when the Alliance for the first time in history put Chapter 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on common defence, into effect. Democratic politicians who scare citizens with arguments that the defence of liberty destroys their security actually become allies of the terrorists. As Benjamin Franklin said: They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.

Adapting NATO to new acute threats both outside our borders and within them is only one part of the problem, because we must seek a solution both in the short and medium term. Its second part is a reaction to changes in the world's power map, which is a question in the middle to long term. It will soon no longer be true that NATO represents the grouping of the economically most-powerful countries in the world. The Alliance has not only lost a clearly-defined enemy, but concurrently, in a relatively short time, its economic foundation for its strategy could come into question. Together with a shift in economic power to Asia, to countries such as China and India, political and military dominance will also move from the USA and Europe.

As I said in the introduction, our world is going through major changes. In those 20 years that have passed since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the bipolar world has become unipolar. The world has shown itself to have one dominant superpower, but with a number of asymmetric threats. Now we are on the path toward a multipolar world, in which, aside from NATO and the USA, Russia, China and India will play important roles… This world cannot be dictated to from one headquarters. But in no way does this mean we should give up our basic mission: The defence of liberty. It is right. It serves all inhabitants of the planet and we simply must find a way how to convince other important players of the importance of these values. It may not be us who will clearly dominate the new world. But we must do everything so that the idea of liberty continues to dominate.

Some questions are clearer, others less so. It is certain that we must complete the security integration of our own Euro-Atlantic space. The states of the Western Balkans are heading toward the Alliance and that is good. With it, the last flashpoint of permanent tension on the old continent disappears. The Balkans will no longer be the "soft underbelly of Europe," as Churchill called it.

The question hangs over the partnership and possible membership of countries such as Ukraine or Georgia. For both, Russia's sharp opposition is unmistakable. And this is a fundamental opposition, not a played one, as is the case with the radar. This is again a conflict between liberty and security. No third country can have the right of veto in the question of a free decision to join NATO. And on the other side, the safety of the world to a large part depends on cooperation between Euro-Atlantic civilisation and Russia. Even if we are competitors in many things, we have common basic interests: The fight against terrorism, the maintenance of the global order and the global political-security balance.

Relations toward the former main enemy will be key for the creation of NATO's security strategy in coming years. Of all the important powers, Russia is closest to the Euro-Atlantic space. Not just geographically, but also in terms of values. I believe that our common interests will in the end prevail over disputes, and that the Alliance, together with Russia, will create the backbone of world security. Cooperation on foreign missions and in the fight against terrorism will create a good foundation toward this.

In my presentation, I explicitly did not mention the importance of trans-Atlantic ties. Of the need for cooperation between Europe and the USA, something I speak about frequently. But I am convinced that it is not necessary here. I do not doubt that everyone in this hall knows: Without the cooperation of the United States and Europe, NATO and the EU, the defence of liberty is a lost thing. With our experience in two world wars and one cold war, we see it absolutely clearly. We must defend liberty against all its enemies. We must defend it at home and in the world. We must defend it for us, as well as for our children and grandchildren. We must defend it against fear, even if that fear leads us to extravagant security measures, or on the other hand to resigning our will to defence. And last but not least: We must defend liberty against the paralyzing belief that it was been won, once and for all. In the words of Thomas Jefferson: The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.

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